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Note
The Call for Campus Conduct Policies: Censorship
or Constitutionally Permissible Limitations
on Speech
A flyer proclaiming "open season on Blacks" and referring
to blacks as "saucer lips, porch monkeys and jigaboos" is
slipped under the door of a dormitory lounge where black stu-
dents are meeting1 A black student hurls anti-Semitic insults
at a Jewish student, including "dirty Jew," "stupid Jews," and
"fucking Jew."2 The Jewish Student Union at Memphis State
University is spray-painted with swastikas and the words
"Hitler is God."3 Asian-American students are harassed and
spat on4 and a member of the Asian Pacific American Law Stu-
dents Association finds a laundry ticket on that club's bulletin
board.5 Members of a fraternity burst into an African Lan-
guages and Literature classroom, yelling racist remarks and
disrupting the class.6 Two white men taunt a black woman stu-
dent as she walks past a university residence hall, and pour
urine on her as they lean out their dormitory room window.7
These stories coincide with an increasing number of stu-
dent-to-student harassment incidents on university campuses
across the country8 In an effort to control harassment of stu-
1. Wilkerson, Campus Race Incidents Disquiet U. of Michigan, N.Y.
Times, Mar. 9,1987, at A12, coL 1.
2. Williams, Race, Scholarship, and Affirmative Action, NATIONAL Rn-
VIEW, May 5, 1989, at 36.
3. ANn-DEFALION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RuTH, COMBATTING BIGOTRY ON
CAlmiUS 2 (1989) [hereinafter COMBATrING BIGOTRY ON CAMPUS].
4. Soltis, Sensitivity Training 101, A.B.a. J., July 1990, at 47.
5. COMBATTING BIGoTRY ON CAMPus, supra note 3, at 2.
6. Worthington, U. of Wisconsin regents move to Main in racism, Chi.
Trib., Apr. 12, 1989, at 2, col. 1; Kim, Wisconsin campus polarizewd by racial
incidents atfrats, Daily Pennsylvanian, Nov. 4, 1988, at 3, cl. 1.
7. Wilson, Colleges' Anti-Harassment Policies Bring Controversy Over
Free-Speech Issues, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 4, 1989, at Al, col. 2, A38, col. 5.
8. A study by the National Institute Against Prejudice & Violence docu-
ments racial incidents occurring since the fall of 1986 at 250 colleges. Lessons
From Bigotry 101, NEWswEEx, Sept. 25, 1989, at 48. The Anti-Defamation
League's (ADL) annual audit of anti-Semitic vandalism and harassment inci-
dents has shown a steady increase in the number of incidents since 1984. In
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dents, universities are promulgating conduct codes that, in va-
rying degrees, restrict speech and activities in the academic
environment.9 The University of Michigan promulgated such a
policy only to have a court strike it down as unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.10
University adminitrators face the continuing problem of
controlling harassment on campus without violating first
amendment interests in freedom of speech. On the one side is
the university's established right to regulate student activities."
A university may promulgate regulations to further its aca-
demic mission and to protect the educational opportunities of
students attending the institution.32 In light of principles of ac-
1984, the ADL recorded incidents of bigotry at six colleges nationwide. 'This
figure doubled to 12 in 1985 and increased again to 19 in 1986. By 1988 the
number jumped to 38 .... " ANTI-DEFAMATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, CIVIL
RIGHTs DIVISION PoLicy BACKGROUND REPORT, CAMPUs ANrI-BrAs CODES: A
NEw FORM OF CENsORSHIP? 1 (1989). The U.S. Department of Justice Commu-
nity Relations Service reported a large increase in racial tension related cases
at institutions of higher education for fiscal year 1988. 1& Similarly, the Na-
tional Gay and Lesbian Task Force reported a rise in reports of bias-motivated
harassment of homosexual students. I-
9. Institutions that have adopted policies specifically dealing with stu-
dent-created harassment speech include Brown University, Emory University,
Pennsylvania State University, Tufts University, Trinity College, the Univer-
sity of California, the University of Connecticut, the University of North Caro-
lina at Chapel Hill, the University of Michigan, the University of
Pennsylvania, and the University of Wisconsin. Several institutions are con-
sidering implementing an anti-harassment policy, including Arizona State Uni-
versity, Eastern Michigan University, the University of Texas at Austin,
Stanford University, Wilson, supra note 7, at A38, col. 5, and the University of
Minnesota, Seebach, U Considering Contmversial Racia, Ethnic Slur Policies,
Minn. Daily, Sept. 22, 1989, at 1, col. 4.
10. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 864-67 (E.D. Mich.
1989). For a further discussion of this case, see infra notes 66-85 and accompa-
nying text.
11. Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077,1089 (8th Cir.
1969) (holding that "a college has the inherent power to promulgate rules and
regulations; that it has the inherent power properly to discipline; that it has
power appropriately to protect itself and its property;, that it may expect that
its students adhere to generally accepted standards of conduct"), cert denied,
398 U.S. 965 (1970), quoted in Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 192 (1972); see also
Speake v. Grantham, 317 F. Supp. 1253,1265 (S.D. Miss. 1970) (finding that "[a]
college or university has the inherent power to promulgate rules and regula-
tions; the right to discipline; the right to protect itself and its property through
lawful means; and the right to expect its students to adhere generally to ac-
cepted standards of conduct commensurate with their approaching maturity
and majority").
12. Shelton v. Trustees of Indiana Univ., 891 F.2d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1989)
(noting that "[a] public university does not violate the First Amendment when
it takes reasonable steps to maintain an atmosphere conducive to study and
learning by designating the time, place, and manner of verbal and especially
[Vol. 75:201
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ademic freedom, the Supreme Court requires that courts defer
broadly to universities in upholding reasonable regulations.'
Juxtaposed against the university's goal of providing hospitable
academic environment are the principles of free expression and
inquiry.'4 Students should be able to hold, vigorously defend,
nonverbal expression"). Universities have the responsibility to promote equal
access to educational opportunities. Each student has the right of equal access
to an education without discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, disa-
bility, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry, or ethnic orig. See Cis-
neros v. Corpus Christi Indep. School Dist., 330 F. Supp. 1377, 1389 (SD.N.Y.
1971) (finding that all persons should have equal access to the educational op-
portunity public schools offer because public schools exist for the benefit of all
persons. Any system of segregation of various groups, whether through overt
segregation or harassment, undermines that equality).
Charles Lawrence, professor of law at Stanford University, argues that
universities are responsible for securing an equal educational opportunity for
all students, and that this obligation provides a compelling justification for
campus conduct codes that ensure students safe passage in university common
areas. Lawrence, The Debates Over Placing Limits on Racist Speech Must Not
Ignore the Damage It Does to Its Victim, Chron. Higher Educ., Oct. 25, 1989,
at B1, col. 2. Lawrence believes that minority students who choose to be on
campus should not have to risk being subjected to harassment speech. IL
13. I& (noting that "the principles of academic freedom counsel courts to
defer broadly to a university's determination of what those steps are").
14. For a discussion regarding balancing of interests, see infm notes 39-43
and accompanying text
Many students, faculty, and commentators, responding to the promulga-
tion of campus conduct codes that prohibit harassment speech, argue that the
codes are too restrictive, and violate the free speech clause of the first amend-
ment. See Page, Liberals mounting own hatefuZ assault on 1st Amendment,
Chli. Trib., July 4,1990, § 1, at 13, col. 1 (arguing that policies restricting speech
that someone finds offensive are themselves offensive because such speech
contains ideas and is bard to define); Dembart, At Stanforcd Lftts Become
Censors, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1987, at A35, col. 2 (arguing that silencing adver-
sarial speech is the wrong way to combat hateful speech and that, because po-
lite, popular speech is never in danger, ugly and repugnant speech is the only
kind of speech that needs protection); France, Hate Goes To College, A.B.A. J.,
July 1990, at 4849 (citing Alan Borovoy, general counsel of the Canadian Civil
Liberties Association, who argues that criminal-type laws are not good tools
with which "to distinguish destructive hatred from constructive tension," and
Alan Keyes, a former Reagan administration official, who finds campus con-
duct codes to be a "patronizing and paternalistic form of a well intentioned r_
cism that cripples blacks").
Professor Gerald Gunther, specifically commenting on a proposed conduct
code at Stanford University, argues that speech cannot and should not be
banned "simply because it is 'offensive' to substantial parts or a majority of a
community." Letter from Professor Gerald Gunther, Stanford University, to
Professor George Parker, Chair of the Student Conduct Legislative Council,
Stanford University (Mar. 10, 1989), reprinted in CANPus REPORT, March 15,
1989, at 16. He contends that "(r]ore speech, not less, is the proper cure for
offensive speech, unless and until the controversial speech runs into such nar-
row constraints as the barrier to incitement to immediate illegal action." Id-
Gunther further argues:
MINNESOTA LAW REVLEW [Vol. 75:201
and promote their ideas in the university setting. Ideas should
Among the core principles is that any official effort to suppress ex-
pression must be viewed with the greatest skepticism and suspicion.
Only in very narrow, urgent circumstances should government or
similar institutions be permitted to inhibit speech. Trua, there are
certain categories of speech that may be prohibited, but the number
and scope of these categories has steadily shrunk over the last 50
years. Face-to-face insults are one such category; but opinions ex-
pressed in debates and arguments about a wide range of political and
social issues should not be suppressed simply because of disagreement
with those views, disagreement with the content of the expression.
Id-
Professor William Cohen, specifically commenting on a proposed conduct
code at Stanford University, argues that personal face-to-face attacks based on
race, religion, national origin, sexual orientation, or gender can be prohibited
if the prohibiting statute is narrowly tailored and precisely drafted, enabling
students to know what is permissible and what is prohibited, but that more
general offensive speech that is offensive should not and cannot be prohibited.
Letter from Professor William Cohen, Stanford University, to Professor
George Parker, Chairman of the Student Conduct Legislative Council, Stan-
ford University (Mar. 10, 1989).
To suggest that the proper cure for abhorrent speech is the prohibition of
all expression is a flagrant rejection of first amendment norms.
"For the colleges not to deal with the racial prejudice on campus is an
abdication of their responsibility in a free society.... They've got to
address those things, but not this way [conduct codes that prohibit of-
fensive speech], both because it doesn't work and because it's incom-
patible with freedom of speech and religion. When you pass a rule
which represses speech, you are avoiding dealing with the underlying
problem and you're passing a rule whose sweep is going to be broader
than the things you're trying to contain."
Barringer, Free Speech and Insults on Campus, N.Y. Times, Apr. 25, 1989, at
A20, col. 1 (quoting Ira Glasser, executive director of the American Civil Lib-
erties Union).
As one Stanford student stated, "'in this whole thing, people seem to
think first of the pain caused, not the freedom involved .... That's reason-
able. I understand that. But it's a dangerous kind of perspective to have."'
Id. (quoting Michael Laris, Stanford sophomore and founder of the Committee
to Protect Free Speech, the campus organization at the forefront of the opposi-
tion to the anti-harassment proposal); see also Wilson, supra note 7, at Al, col.
2 (stating that some university officials are concerned that discussion of sensi-
tive subjects on campuses is being squelched by anti-harassment policies and
that the way to fight discrimination is by discussing issues, not by penalizing
students). But see Lawrence, supra note 12, at B!, col. 2 (arguing that if the
purpose of the first amendment is to support the greatest amount of speech,
harassment speech does not further this goal). Lawrence argues that harassed
persons perceive derogatory comments as a slam, rather than as the exposition
of an idea, and once an invective is uttered, dialogue is not likely to follow. Id.
"'Equality is a necessary precondition to free speech,"' according to Lawrence
and he suggests that "'content regulation of racist speech is not just permissi-
ble but, in certain circumstances, may be required by the Constitution."'
Statement of law Professor Charles Lawrence, Stanford University, quoted in
France, supra, at 48. Lawrence further argues that such insults are particu-
larly undeserving of first amendment protection because such expression is in-
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prosper or wane according to their merits.'5 Respect for this
right requires that students tolerate expressions or opinions
they find abhorrent.' 6
This Note suggests that existing hostile environment har-
assment jurisprudence is helpful in resolving these conflicting
interests. The standards used in analyzing Title VIHi 7 work-
place hostile-environment harassment and Title IX8 academic
hostile environment harassment provide a guide for determin-
ing when a university's interest in maintaining a non-hostile
environment overcomes the first amendment presumption
against restriction of free expression.
Part I looks at the problems university administrators en-
counter in combatting campus harassment, describing the ex-
tent of serious harassment on campus and outlining existing
first amendment jurisprudence dealing with freedom of expres-
sion on campus. Part H offers a regulatory solution for campus
harassment. This Note concludes that carefully drafted campus
harassment policies that incorporate Title VII and Title IX hos-
tile environment concepts may alleviate serious harassment in-
cidents on campus while preserving students' free speech rights
under the first amendment. 9
I. THE PROBLEM: ADDRESSING HARASSMENT
A. CAMPUS HARASSMENT AND TE UNIvERSITY RESPONSE
In recent years, universities have witnessed an increasing
tended to injure the victim rather than promote dialogue or discover truth.
Lawrence, supra note 12, at BI, col. 2.
Professor of Law Mari Matsuda, University of Hawaii, arguing for con-
tent-based regulations of speech, also believes that speech is meaningless to
people who are not equal in society. France, supra, at 48 (discussing Professor
Marl Matsuda's views).
15. See T. Grey, Interpretation of [Stanford's] Fundamental Standard 1,(Oct. 1989) (on file with the Minnesota Law Review) (explaining the provi-
sions of Stanford's proposed harassment policy).
16. Ii
17. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title VII, § 701, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat.
253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V
1987)).
18. Educational Amendments of 1972, Title IX, § 901, Pub. L. No. 92-318,
86 Stat. 373 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1988)).
19. The purpose of this Note is to suggest one way to approach the harass-
ment problems on university campuses. This Note does not attempt to define
the constitutional limits of speech in the university context. Instead it demon-
strates that at least one functional approach to the problem of harassment on
campus is mindful of first amendment principles.
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number of harassment incidents 3 on their campuses 1 These
incidents have ranged from hate-filled graffiti and distribution
of hate-filled fliers to destruction of anti-apartheid shanties,
displaying of Ku Klux Klan robes at anti-apartheid rallies, and
shouting anti-Semitic insults at students.&= For example, a fra-
ternity at the University of Wisconsin threw a "Fiji Island
Party," painted themselves in blackface, and set up a large cari-
cature cutout of a black man with a bone through his nose on
the lawn outside their fraternity house.23 A black student at
Vassar College hurled anti-Semitic insults such as "dirty Jew,"
"stupid Jews," and "fucking Jew" at a Jewish student. . Uni-
versity of Delaware campus sidewalks were defaced with anti-
gay slogans such as "Step Here, Kill a Queer" and "Stay in the
Closet Fag."2 5 Students driving by a black student walking
home from a campus bar yelled "Niggers, go home" and "Nig-
gers, we ought to lynch you."2 6
20. Hate or bias incidents are motivated by an animus against the victim
because of the victim's religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity, or national ori-
gin. ANTi-DEFAATION LEAGUE OF B'NAI B'RITH, HATE CPmES: POLICiES AND
PROCEDURES FOR LAW ENFoRCEMENT AGENCIES 1 (1988) [hereinafter POLiCIEs
AND PROCEDURES FOR LAw ENFORCEmENT].
21. For statistics regarding harassment on university campuses, see supra
note 8.
22. Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief at 7-8, Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (ED.
Mich. 1989) (No. 89-71683); Lessons From Bigotry 101, supra note 8, at 48.
23. Coniff, Racism 101, PRoGREssivE, Dec. 1988, at 30.
24. Williams, supra note 2, at 36.
25. COMBATrING BIGOTRY ON CAMPUS, supra note 3, at 2.
26. Id. Many more incidents probably go unreported, or at least unpub-
licized. Incidents that have been publicized include the following examples
from the University of Michigan: the campus radio station broadcast of racistjokes by student callers; a flyer containing a poem telling black Americans to
go back to Africa slipped under the door of a black student's dormitory room;
graffiti in a graduate student's library carrel that stated, 'Die, Chink. Hostile
Americans want your yellow hide;" posters or walls defaced with 'Kill fags,"
and "Jesus hates niggers;" and a bouquet of helium-filled condoms pinned to
the door of a student's room with the message "Jewish slut." See Defendant's
Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunctive Relief,
supra note 22, at 7-8.
A University of Wisconsin fraternity had its pledges dress up in afro wigs
and blackface and.hold a slave auction. Conniff, supra note 23, at 33. At
Smith College, the words 'niggers, Spics, and Chinks Quit Complaining or Get
Out" were painted on a campus building. Williams, supra note 2, at 36. At the
University of California, Berkeley, "Nips Go Home" was scrawled on a wall.
Id A leaflet opposing Holocaust studies and a swastika painted on the wall
were found at Stanford University. Id-
In January, 1988 and in August, 1989, Rutgers' B'nai Brith Hillel Founda-
tion building was defaced with swastikas and anti-Semitic slogans such as 'Die
Jew." COMBATING BIGOTRY ON CAMPUs, supra note 3, at 2. In April 1988, a
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Hate or bias incidents - those motivated by an animus
against the victim's race, religion, sexual orientation, ethnicity
group calling itself the "Committee for an AIDS-free America" posted signs
depicting skulls and crossbones and stating that "Homo-cide has a definite
place at Penn State" on the Penn State campus. I& In August 1988, arson was
suspected when the first Black fraternity house on the University of Missis-
sippi campus burned down before members moved in. Id In November 1988,
someone defaced a brochure about the Women of Color and the Law Confer-
ence posted on the New York University Law School Black Allied Law Stu-
dent Associations' bulletin board. Shortly thereafter, the New York
University Law School's Asian Pacific American Law Students Association
found a laundry ticket on its bulletin board. Id. The University of Kansas
B'nai B'rith Hillel Foundation's Israel display was defaced with pro-PLO slo-
gans, and a letter containing statements such as "Jew-Boy get out" and 'Tm
gonna burn your Torah" was taped to the Foundation's door. Id. In the fall of
1988, the Memphis State University Jewish Student Union was spray-painted
with swastikas and the words "Hitler is God." I&
A Boston University male student called lesbian students meeting in a
dorm lounge "fucking dykes." He then grabbed one of the women, threw her
against a glass wall, and threatened to kill another of the women who tried to
intervene. Id A Native American student received several hate mailings
while serving as the Macalester College Community Council President. One
mailin read-
You are a red-skinned bitch, and Custer should have finished off your
entire degenerate race... Why dont you go home to the reservation
- get drunk, and pack your whole miserable, alcoholic family into a
rusty 1967 Chevy pick-up - and drive off a bridge.
Id.
At Northern Illinois University, white students hollered racial epithets at
black students attending a speech by the Rev. Jesse Jackson. Bowen, Wrong
Message from Academe, TnM Apr. 6,1987, at 57. An unsanctioned Northern
Illinois University student publication printed degrading verse: "O.K.,/Look
nigger,/we are white/white is supreme./Jesus was white./God is white./All of
our Presidents have been white./Thank you God." Id. Additionally, Northern
Illinois University buses were littered with swastika-adorned flyers proclaim-
ing "NIGGERS GET OUT." I&
An Emory University student returned to her dorm room to find her
teddy bear slashed, her clothes drenched with bleach, and "Nigger Hang" writ-
ten on the wall. As she prepared to move out of the dorm a month later be-
cause of additional threats received, the student lifted her rug and found "Die
Nigger Die" written on the floor. Gibbs, Bigots in the Ivory Tower, TaME, May
7,1990, at 104.
Five white cadets dressed like Ku Klux Klansmen burst into a sleeping
black cadet's room at the Citadel. After a scuffle, the intruders fled, leaving
behind a charred paper cross. Clendinen, Citadel's Cadets Feeling Fffects of a
Elan-Like Act, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1986, § 1, at 26, col. 1.
Racially motivated fighting broke out at the University of Massachusetts
after the New York Mets defeated the Boston Red Sox in the seventh game of
the World Series, leaving ten people injured, including a black student who
was beaten unconscious. It appeared that white students perceived the Mets
as a black team and looked for a surrogate, black students, on which to take
revenge. Weld, Racism Blamed for Brawl at U. of Massachusetts, N.Y. Times,
Feb. 6, 1987, at A12, col. 2.
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or national origin - can have a unique emotional and psycho-
logical impact on the victim and the university community.
These incidents can "exacerbate racial.., tensions, and lead to
reprisals by others in the community, thereby... escalating vi-
olence and turmoil."2' The problem worsens when particularly
isolated and vulnerable individuals lose faith in the institution's
willingness or ability to ameliorate the situation.a
Administrators at numerous universities and colleges are
searching for appropriate constitutional methods for regulating
harassment on campus.P Drafting regulations that comport
with the Constitution, however, is a difficult task.e Many insti-
tutions have adopted varying anti-harassment conduct codes.Y
Some conduct codes impose an outright ban on offensive ex-
pression in certain contextsca For example, the University of
Connecticut expels students from classes if students use dispar-
aging names, inappropriately directed laughter, insensitive
27. PoIcIEs Arn PRocEUm FOR LAW ENFORCEm=NT, supra note 20, at
1.
28. The damage from hate or bias incidents cannot be measured solely in
physical or economic terms. Id. Many students are away from home for the
first time and are in a vulnerable stage of development. Matsuda, Public Re-
sponse to Racist Sloeeck Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MIcH. L. REv.
2320, 2370 (1989). This vulnerability may increase the risk of alienation and
imply a greater susceptibility to harassment speech. Hate or bias incidents
may intimidate other members of a minority group, leaving them feeling iso-
lated. See icK Allowing members of minority communities to become fearful,
angry, and suspicious of other groups and of the power structure that is sup-
posed to protect them, can damage and fragment a university community and
interfere with the university's mission of providing minority students with
equal access to a non-discriminatory education. Ia at 2370-7L Some minority
students are avoiding predominantly white universities. I& at 2371 n.251.
Some students might even avoid attending school because of the threat of har-
assment. This result is especially likely if the targeted group perceives inac-
tion on the part of university officials. I& University inaction also may make
perpetrators believe that their behavior is acceptable. Id. at 2371.
29. For a list of universities that have promulgated or are considering
campus conduct codes, see supra note 9.
30. For a discussion of the University of Michigan's failed attempt to draft
a constitutional campus conduct code, see infia notes 66-85 and accompanying
text
31. See supra note 9.
32. ' Iat ban" policies prohibit students from engaging in any kind of of-
fensive behavior, whether or not it is directed against a particular individual.
An institution with such a ban would not only penalize a student for directly
physically or verbally attacking other students, but also for scrawling epithets
on university property, putting up posters on campus that include racial slurs,
or wearing T-shirts that are offensive to a recognized group. Wilson, Colleges
Take 2 Approaches in Adopting Anti-Harassment Plans, Chron. Higher Educ.,
Oct. 4, 1989, at A38, col. 1.
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jokes, or conspicuously exclude another student from conversa-
tion.P The University of Pennsylvania penalizes students for
"'any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victim-
izes individuals' and 'creates an intimidating or offensive envi-
ronment."'34 At Tufts University, students are penalized for
using slurs in classrooms or residence halls, but students may
use the same insults in student newspaper articles, on the cam-
pus radio station, or in a public lecture.3
Other universities attempt to mediate when a group on
campus finds certain speech or actions offensive.ss In these in-
stances, the conduct codes focus on restricting the place and
manner of expression, rather than on restricting the right of
expression per se. For example, a confederate flag flying
outside a white fraternity house disturbed black students at
Clemson University. The fraternities met with school adminis-
trators and reached a compromise: the flag would be hung in-
side the house. 7
B. THE FrST AMENDMENT AND THE UNIVERSry: TIME,
PLACE, AND MANNER RESTRICTIONS
The Supreme Court is cautious when resolving freedom of
expression cases arising in an academic community context.es
The Court's deliberations involve two competing interests.
First, students, faculty, and administrators have a mutual inter-
est in having an environment free from disruption of the educa-
tional process.P In addition, the academic community has an
innate interest in the greatest liberty for "free expression and




36. See Lessons From Bigor 101, urap note 8, at 49.
37. I.
38. Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 171 (1972).
39. Id. at 171; see also Wright, The Comjitution on the Campu=, 22 VAND.
L. REv. 1027, 041-42 (1969) (stating that there is no first amendment objection
to limiting use of public academic facilities to the purpose for which they have
been designed).
40. Healy, 408 U.S. at 171. Although acknowledging the need for campus
order, the Court believes that universities should not apply first amendment
protections with any less vigor than does the community at large. Ia at 180.
"The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than
in the community of American schools." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487
(1960). "The college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the
'marketplace of ideas,' and we break no new constitutional ground reaffirming
this Nation's dedication to safeguarding academic freedom." Healy, 408 U.S. at
1990]
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Supporting the first interest, universities have the author-
ity to "enforce reasonable rules governing student conduct."41
Universities are not exempt, however, from the first amend-
ment's mandate of free expression.42 Balancing both interests,
universities may make reasonable time, place, and manner reg-
ulations.43 To pass constitutional muster, however, such regula-
tions may not restrict speech based on content. 4
Several Supreme Court cases reflect this balance of inter-
ests, and show the Court's use of time, place, and manner re-
strictions. In Healy v. James,45 the plaintiffs attempted to
organize a chapter of Students for a Democratic Society at Cen-
tral Connecticut State College. The College refused to recog-
nize the group because the College's administration believed
the group would advocate disruption and violence at the
school. 46 The student group filed suit, alleging that the Col-
180-81 (citing Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-50 (1957) (plurality opinion); 354 U.S. at
262 (Frankfurter, J., concurring in result)). But see Wright, supra note 39, at
1040 (suggesting that just because a public university is owned by the public
and generally open to the public, activities allowed in other places due to the
first amendment should not necessarily be permitted at the university). 'The
public character of a university does not grant to individuals a license to en-
gage in activities which disrupt the activities to which those facilities are dedi-
cated." Id. (citing A. FORTAS, CONCERNING DIssENT AND CiVIL DIsOBEDIENcE
46-47 (19 )).
41. Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 669-70 (1973).
42. I& at 670.
43. I& Universities must balance first amendment principles of freedom
of speech against their interest in providing all students with an academic en-
vironment conducive to learning. Although free speech is essential to our
democratic society, that fact alone does not mean that people are free to ex-
press their beliefs at any time or in any place. See Virginia State Bd. of Phar-
macy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)
(concluding that the Court is more likely to validate time, place, and manner
restrictions on speech if the restrictions are not merely an attempt to regulate
the content of the speech, and if the regulations leave open ample alternative
channels for communication of the information); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S.
39, 47-48 (1966) (finding that the first amendment does not guarantee the right
to communicate one's view whenever, wherever, or however one pleases); Cox
v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536; 554 (1965) (finding that "[t]he rights of free speech
and assembly, while fundamental in our democratic society, still do not mean
that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any
public place and at any time"); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395, 405(1953) (same); see also Healy, 408 U.S. at 192-93 (finding that "reasonable regu-
lations with respect to the time, the place, and the manner in which student
groups conduct their speech-related activities must be respected").
44. See infra notes 59, 63.
45. 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
46. Id- at 174-76. The school president found the organization's philosophy
antithetical to the school's policies, and believed the group's independence
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lege's refusal violated the students' first amendment rights of
expression and association.47 The Supreme Court ruled for the
students, but remanded the case for a more exacting determina-
tion of the facts.4 The Court found that the lower courts had
made a fundamental error in not recognizing the students' first
amendment interests 49 It also found, however, at least one ac-
ceptable ground that would support the College's action:sO If
the factual record supported the College's claim that the stu-
dent political group would be a disruptive influence on campus,
the president could deny the group official recognition.s ' The
Court ruled that the College may prohibit actions that "materi-
ally and substantially disrupt the work and discipline of the
school. ' 52 A university does not have to tolerate activities
when "they infringe reasonable campus rules, interrupt classes,
or substantially interfere with the opportunity of other stu-
dents to obtain an education."- Such a regulation is directed
against disruption of reasonable academic policies, not against
the expression's content.P
Similarly, the Eighth Circuit found that university admin-
from the national organization, which advocated disruption and violence,
doubtful. The president concluded school recognition should not be granted to
any group that "openly repudiates" the school's commitment to academic free-
dom. I& at 176.
47. Id. at 177.
48. Id at 184-85.
49. 1I The College denied abridging the students' constitutional rights,
and the lower courts upheld the university's view. The lower courts concluded
that the students were denied only the "administrative seal of official college
respectability." I& at 182 (quoting Healy v. James, 319 F. Supp. 113, 116 (D.
Conn. 1970)).
50. 1I at 185.
51. Id. at 188-89. After the lower court hearing, the school president
stated that he rejected recognizing the group because he concluded that this
group would disrupt school activities. I&c at 188.
52. I at 189 (citing Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S.
503, 513 (1969)). The Court also found that the College could have refused to
recognize the group if the College determined that the group did not intend to
abide by reasonable campus rules. rI at 191-94.
53. Xi at 189. The Court concluded that the record in this particular case
presented no substantial basis for allowing the school to enforce such a policy.
rI at 191-94.
54. Any speech that disrupts academic policies can be subject to time,
place, and manner restrictions, not because the president disagreed with the
content of the speech, but because the speech disrupts the academic atmos-
phere. See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169,192-93 (1972) (finding that although a
university cannot block a group's associational rights because of the nature of
the group, a university can require a group to adhere to reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions); Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 670 (1973)
(finding that a university cannot ban the dissemination of ideas, no matter
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istrators could prohibit campus distribution of a student news-
paper that university officials thought contained an
inappropriate and obscene headline not conducive to the
school's educational mission in Papish v. Board of Curators.
The court did not decide whether the headline was obscene;
rather, it found the student's right to choose the manner of ex-
pression subordinate to the university's right to protect its aca-
demic environments6 provided that the university did not seek
how offensive, because of the ideas' content, but that reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on the dissemination are permissible).
55. 464 F.2d 136, 142-44 (8th Cir. 1972), mv'd per curiam, 410 U.S. 667
(1973). In this case, the University of Missouri expelled a graduate student for
distributing a newspaper that featured the headline ' motherfucker acquitted"
and a cover page with a cartoon showing a clubwielding policeman raping the
Statute of Liberty and the Goddess of Justice. Id at 138-41. The University
claimed that the distribution of the publication violated a rule requiring stu-
dents to conduct themselves in a manner compatible with the University's
functions and mission as an educational institution. I&
The graduate student sued the University, claiming that the University
impermissibly expelled her for exercising first amendment guaranteed free-
doms. She also alleged that the University's rules were unconstitionally vague
and that the language of the rule under which she was dismissed was over-
broad. Id. at 141. The Eighth Circuit found little merit in her claim and
found the University's dismissal constitutional. IM. at 145.
56. Id. at 145. Citing one of its earlier opinions dealing with university
regulations, the court first held the rule not unconstitutionally vague.
[There is] little basically or constitutionally wrong with flexibility and
reasonable breadth, rather than meticulous specificity, in college reg-
ulations relating to conduct. Certainly these regulations are not to be
compared with the criminal statute. They are codes of general con-
duct which those qualified and experienced in the field have charac-
terized not as punishment but as part of the educational process itself
and as preferably to be expressed in general rather than in specific
terms.
Id at 142-43 (citing Esteban v. Central Missouri State College, 415 F.2d 1077,
1088 (8th Cir. 1969)). The court found the rule at issue did invest university
officials with some flexibility in its application, but that it was not unconstitu-
tionally vague, nor would it invite invidious censorship. I at 143. The rule,
the court found, was easy to understand, and the Constitution requires no
more. Id.
The court also found the rule was not unconstitutionally overbroad. The
court held the rule did not confer unbridled power on university officials to
suppress conduct or speech they found distasteful. Id. Rather, the court found
"the rule serves the narrow purpose of authorizing punishment only of those
who engage in conduct or speech that detracts from the effectiveness of the
educational process." Id
The Supreme Court held in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973),
that a state regulation will not be struck down as facially overbroad when
there is a substantial core of activity to which it may be properly applied rela-
tive to its possible unconstitutional applications.
[Trhe plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial over-
breadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of prac-
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to restrict the substantive message of the speech.57 On review,
the Supreme Court reversed on the particular facts of the case,
finding that the .University of Missouri had prohibited the
newspaper's distribution because University officials disliked
the headline - a content-based restriction that violated the
first amendment.P Despite the reversal, the Court reaffirmed
a university's authority to promulgate reasonable time, place,
and manner restrictions on student speech as long as such rules
do not contravene the first amendment. 59
tice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the
otherwise unprotected behavior that it forbids the State to sanction
moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that conduct - even if
expressive - falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws
that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive
controls over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter protected
speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that ef-
fect - at best a prediction - cannot with confidence, justify invali-
dating a statute on its face and so prohibiting a State from enforcing
the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its power to
proscribe.
I& at 615-16, cited in Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Preliminary Injunctive Relief, sumz note 22, at 22.
57. The court did find, however, that a university may not punish a stu-
dent for advocating a particular idea. Papish, 464 F.2d at 144. Under these
facts, the Eighth Circuit found that the University was not punishing the stu-
dent for the content of her speech, but for the manner in which she sought to
express her opinions. Id The court found that a university constitutionally
can regulate the means by which students express views, as long as the regula-
tion does so without effectively repressing students? ability to advocate their
causes. I at 144-45. Finally, the court found that the Constitution does not
place such a great value on freedom of expression that it can never be
subordinated to other interests, such as the use and display of language on a
university campus. I& at 145.
58. The Supreme Court overruled the Eighth Circuit in Papish v. Board
of Curators, 410 U.S. 667, 671 (1973) (per curiam). The Court found that
although a state university has the "undoubted prerogative to enforce reason-
able rules governing student conduct," such rules may not contravene the
scope of the first amendment. Id. at 669-70.
59. The Court left the Eighth Circuit's legal analysis intact. Id, at 667-71.
The implication, therefore, is that a university may reasonably restrict the
context of speech as long as it does not proscribe the content of the speech.
See also Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 161,192-93 (1972) (finding that a state univer-
sity may impose reasonable rules of student conduct provided the policy does
not limit the content of expression); Cox v. Louiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965)
(discussing time, manner, and place restrictions). The Cox Court held-
It is, of course, undisputed that appropriate, limited discretion, under
properly drawn statutes or ordinances, concerning the time, place, dis-
cretion or manner of use of the streets for public assemblies may be
vested in administrative officials, provided that such limited discretion
is "exercised with 'uniformity of method of treatment upon the facts
of each application, free from improper or inappropriate considera-
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Finally, in the Supreme Court's most recent decision deal-
ing with freedom of expression at universities, Widmar v. Vin-
cent,60 the University of Missouri at Kansas City refused to
renew permission for a student religious group to hold meet-
ings in University facilities.6' Members of the group sued, al-
leging that the regulation violated their first amendment rights
to freedom of religion and speech 62 The Supreme Court held
that the University's exclusionary policy violated the first
amendment principle requiring speech regulations to be con-
tent neutral.6 3 The Court specifically noted the narrowness of
its holding, however, adding that it did not intend its holding to
frustrate a university's right to promulgate reasonable time,
place, and manner regulations. 4 Further, the Court confirmed
the validity of cases recognizing a university's right to exclude
even first amendment protected activities that violate reason-
able campus rules or that substantially interfere with the op-
portunity of other students to obtain an education 6 5
Healy, Papish, and Widrmzr suggest that the Supreme
Court is receptive to time, place, and manner restrictions on
campus speech as long as the regulations parallel the institu-
tions and from unfair discrimination... [and with] a 'systematic, con-
sistent and-just order of treatment, with reference to the convenience
of public use of highways . . .
Id (citations omitted).
For a discussion of a university's right to regulate students' activities, see
supra notes 11-12.
60. 454 U.S. 263, 263-69 (1981).
61. Id. at 265. The University adopted a regulation that prohibited use of
University buildings or grounds "'for purposes of religious worship or reli-
gious teaching."' I& (quoting Board of Curators Regulation 4.0314.0107
(1972)).
62. I. at 266.
63. Id. at 267-77. The Court found that the University had created a fo-
rum generally open for use by student groups. Id. at 267. The University dis-
criminated, however, against student groups and speakers expressing a desire
to use the open forum for religious discussion. I& at 269. The Court found
that to justify such a restriction, the University had to show that the regula-
tion is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that the regulation
was narrowly drawn to achieve that end. I& at 270 (citing Carey v. Brown, 447
U.S. 455, 461, 464-65 (1980)). The University argued that it had an interest in
promoting a secular rather than religious education. I& at 270-74. The Court
found that this was not sufficient to overcome the burden the policy imposed
on the students' first amendment rights. Id. at 273-74.
64. Id- at 276-77; see also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116
(1972) (stating that "(t]he nature of a place, 'the pattern of its normal activi-
ties, dictate the kinds of regulations of time, place, and manner that are rea-
sonable"' (quoting Wright, sup note 39, at 1042)).
65. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277 (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 161, 188-89
(1972)).
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tion's educational mission and remain content neutral.
Although the Supreme Court has not yet directly addressed
whether campus conduct policies that restrict expression would
fit under a time, place, and manner scheme, a federal district
court recently addressed the closely related issue of when a
university constitutionally may prohibit speech in order to fa-
cilitate a productive academic atmosphere.6a
C. DOE V. UNIVESITY OF MICHGAN
In 1988, the Board of Regents of the University of MAichi-
gan promulgated the "Policy.on Discrimination and Discrimina-
tory Harassment by Students in the University Environment"
(Michigan Policy or Policy). The Policy regulated the state-
ments and associations of all students in public forums, educa-
tional and academic centers, and in University housing. It
prohibited speech that stigmatizes an individual based on an
immutable characteristic,67 or speech that creates an intimidat-
ing, hostile, or demeaning environment for educational pur-
suits.P Violation of the Policy subjected a student to a wide
66. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
67. The characteristics included race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orien-
tation, creed, national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap, or Viet-
nam-era veteran status. Id. at 856.
68. The Michigan Policy established a three-tiered system based on the lo-
cation of the conduct at issue. The University tolerated a broad range of
speech in public parts of the campus. Ici Only an act of physical violence or
destruction of property was considered sanctionable in these areas. I Uni-
versity sponsored publications constituted the second tier of the policy, and
were not subject to regulation under the policy. The third tier of the policy
applied to "educational and academic centers, such as classroom buildings, li-
braries, research laboratories, recreation and study centers." I. In these ar-
eas, persons were subject to discipline for:.
1. Any behavior, verbal or physical, that stigmatizes or victimizes on
the basis of race, ethnicity, religion, sex, sexual orientation, creed,
national origin, ancestry, age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-
era veteran status, and that
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's aca-
demic efforts, employment, participation in University spon-
sored extra-curricular activities or personal safety, or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfer-
ing with an individual's academic efforts, employment, partic-
ipation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or
personal safety;, or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment
for educational pursuits, employment or participation in Uni-
versity sponsored extra-curricular activities.
2. Sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and verbal or physical
conduct that stigmatizes or victimizes an individual on the basis of
sex or sexual orientation where such behavior.
19901
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range of sanctions, including expulsion.6 9
Doe,70 a graduate student in biology, challenged the Michi-
gan Policy, asserting that its enforcement violated his right of
freedom of expression.71 Doe feared that discussion of certain
controversial theories positing biologically-based differences be-
tween the sexes might violate the code.7 - The University ar-
gued that its Policy restricted constitutionally unprotected
speech, or speech justifying little protection.7s The code prohib-
a. Involves an express or implied threat to an individual's aca-
demic efforts, employment, participation in University spon-
sored extra-curricular activities or personal safety; or
b. Has the purpose or reasonably foreseeable effect of interfer-
ing with an: individual's academic efforts, employment, partic-
ipation in University sponsored extra-curricular activities or
personal safety, or
c. Creates an intimidating, hostile, or demeaning environment
for educational pursuits, employment or participation in Uni-
versity sponsored extra-curricular activities.
Id-
On August 22, 1989, the University withdrew § 1(c) to further clarify and
explain the provision. I& The University did not, however, withdraw the
identical provision in § 2(c). Id The University gave no explanation for the
inconsistency. Id. One possible explanation is that courts routinely uphold
prohibition of hostile environment harassment under Title VII, and § 2(c)
closely parallels parts 6f Title VII.
69. Ida at 857. Under the Policy, one or more of the following sanctions
could have been imposed, depending on the severity of the infraction: formal
reprimand, community service, class attendance, restitution, removal from spe-
cific courses and activities, suspension, or expulsion. Suspension or expulsion
could be imposed only for violent or dangerous acts, repeated offenses, or a
willful failure to comply with a lesser sanction. Id.
70. Doe is the fictitious name of a psychology graduate student at the Uni-
versity of Michigan: Id at 852.
71. Complaint for the Plaintiff at 2, Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F.
Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (No. 89-71683).
72. Doe claimed that controversial theories positing biologically-based dif-
ferences between sexes and races, which Doe wanted to discuss in class, could
be sanctionable under the Policy as sexist or racist Univesity of Michigan,
721 F. Supp. at 858. Doe argued that the Michigan Policy chilled free expres-
sion because of the Policy's breadth and vagueness. Doe alleged that the un-
derlying premises of the Policy were totally inconsistent with three
fundamental first amendment principles: 1) restrictions on expression must
be, as a general rule, content neutral; 2) expression does not lose its protected
status simply because of its offensiveness; and 3) expression is entitled to
heightened protection in the academic context. Plaintiff's Brief in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 12-14, Doe v. University of
Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989) (No. 89-71683).
73. Defendant's Brief in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary
Injunctive Relief, supra note 22, at 13.
The Policy affects only unprotected speech under two related and
constitutionally sound theories: (1) the speech covered is no essential
part of any exposition of ideas and its very utterance inflicts injury,
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ited speech that inflicts injury on an individual7 4 and the Uni-
versity argued that such expressions are fighting words and
thus not entitled to the protection of the first amendment 7 -5
A federal district court struck down the Michigan Policy as
an unconstitutional infringement on Doe's first amendment
rights.76 The court noted that the Policy proscribed a signifi-
cant range of protected verbal conduct77 and consequently held
and (2) the context of the racist speech renders it unprotected or min-
imally protected under the Court's captive audience doctrine.
14
74. 14
The Supreme Court has never held a law unconstitutional where the
challenged law penalized the use of words that inflict injury on a par-
ticular person, especially where the words used are invectives or epi-
thets. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has held that the use of
words as weapons which inflict injury may be constitutionally prohib-
ited. 'It is not plausible to uphold the right to use words as projectiles
where no exchange of views is involved."
Id. (citing L. TmE, AmRiCAN CONSTrrUTIONAL LAw 837 (2d ed. 1988)).
75. Id. at 14. The University likened racist and similar expression prohib-
ited under the Policy to the type of expression the Supreme Court left unpro-
tected in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). Under the
Chav linsky "fighting words" exception, statements directed at individuals who
had not voluntarily exposed themselves to the invective are equated with inju-
rious speech aimed at a captive audience. See Ch azlisky, 315 U.S. at 572. A
well known example was given by Justice Holmes: 'The most stringent pro-
tection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a the-
ater and causing a panic." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919)
(Holmes, J.). Fighting words have the same element of surprise and will
likely provoke a violent response from the listener who had no chance to avoid
listening. See Lasson, Group Libel Versus Free Speech" When Big Brother
Should Butt In, 23 DUQ. L. Rxv. 77, 92 (1984) (suggesting applying the "fight-
ing words" exception to the Nazi march through Skokie, Ill.).
The district court found that under certain circumstances racial and eth-
nic statements might constitute "fighting words." University of Michigan, 721
F. Supp. at 862. The court failed to specify, however, what statements would
fall into such a category. The court also found that speech likely to incite im-
minent lawless action and that has that effect may be prohibited. Id at 862-63
(citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969)). The first amendment
does not protect legally obscene speech. AL (citing Miller v. California, 413
U.S. 15, 22 (1973)). Nor does it necessarily protect speech that is 'vugar," "of-
fensive," or "shocking." I&4 (citing Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478
U.S. 675 (1986)). Once again, the district court did not cite examples of speech
that would fall into these categories of unprotected speech.
76. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 853.
77. r& The University challenged Doe's standing, alleging that the Policy
had never been applied to proscribe classroom discussion of legitimate ideas
and that Doe did not demonstrate a credible threat of enforcement against
him. Id. at 858. The court, however, found Doe had standing. Based on the
legislative history of the Policy and a guide issued concurrently by the Univer-
sity (the University later repudiated the guide), the court held that Doe
demonstrated a realistic and credible threat of enforcement. Id. at 859-60. De-
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the Policy overbroad both on its face and as applied.78 The
court also found the enforcement of the Policy would violate
due process rights, because the terms of the Policy were so
vague that it was impossible to discern any limitation on the
Policy's scope or any conceptual distinction between protected
and unprotected speech.79 Further, the University of Michi-
gan's Policy failed to comply with first amendment principles
because it prohibited the expression of racist and sexist ideas
rather than merely restricting the time and place that ideas
could be expressed.8 0
The district court, asserting first amendment principles, ap-
propriately rejected the University's attempt to reconcile com-
batting harassment.8 ' The attempt to classify the Policy as
merely a fighting words prohibition failed because the Policy
did not adequately define what speech constituted fighting
words. Without such a definition, the Policy swept protected
speech into unprotected speech categories.8 2 Further, the court
found the task of defining broad categories of speech to fall into
the narrow fighting words exception is an almost insurmounta-
ble assignmentPss
The district court did not preclude, however, the possibility
that a university could promulgate a harassment policy that
would survive constitutional review. The court found that a
university could establish internal policies that sanctioned the
exposure of women or minorities to hostile or offensive work-
place environments.84 Similarly, the court noted a university
may subject all speech and conduct to reasonable and nondis-
criminatory time, place, and manner restrictions that are nar-
rowly tailored and allow for ample alternative means of
spite the University's denial, the court determined that the University had
sanctioned speech made during classroom discussion. Ii at 865. The court
lauded the effort to rid the campus of harassment, but concluded that the Uni-
versity failed to consider first amendment considerations before accusing stu-
dents of impropriety under the Policy. I- at 853.
78. Ia at 866.
79. Id at 866-67.
80. Metz, Bad Appls, Evil Deeds, STuDENT LAw., Feb. 1990, at 33.
81. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 868 (finding no evidence that
anyone at the University ever seriously attempted to reconcile the goal of com-
batting harassment with first amendment principles).
82. I at 867.
83. Id
84. I& at 862 (holding that the first amendment "presents no obstacle to
the establishment of internal University sanctions as to any of these categories
of conduct, over and above any remedies already supplied by state or federal
law") (citing Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)).
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communication.a A policy designed to control harassing
speech on university campuses must consider first amendment
values and, in light of these values, clearly define impermissible
expression.
11. A PROPOSED SOLUTION
The problem at hand is curing the legal infirmities of the
University of Michigan Policy. How does a university balance
first amendment rights with academic interests to promulgate a
policy adequately encompassing these interests? Courts have
already addressed similar questions in another area of law -
workplace hostile environment harassment. Workplace hostile
environments pit the victim's right to freedom from harassing
expression against an alleged harasser's free speech right8 6 To
deal with this situation, the Supreme Court has sanctioned a
type of time, place, and manner restriction.82 Universities may
85. RE at 863 (citing Heffron v. Intl Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, 452
U.S. 640 (1981)). The district court held that a university may not establish an
anti-discrimination policy that has the effect of prohibiting certain speech be-
cause the school disagrees with the ideas or messages conveyed or that prohib-
its speech because it is offensive to students. I& at 863 (citing Texas v.
Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2544-45 (1989)). The district court noted that princi-
ples of freedom of expression take on a special significance in a university en-
vironment because "free and unfettered interplay of competing views is
essential to the institution's educational mission." I. (citing Keyishian v.
Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957)). For additional discussion of time, place, and manner restric-
tions on university campuses, see supra notes 45-64.
86. The first amendment does not apply to the private workplace. The
courts' analyses of the balance of interests, however, are the same as in a pub-
lie sector first amendment context. See United Steelworkers of America,
AFL-CIO-CLL v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S. 102, 111 (1982) (finding that the first
amendment is not necessarily relevant in the private sector labor context).
87. For a discussion of hostile environments, see iSfm notes 88-114 and
accompanying text. Professor Charles Lawrence of Stanford University sug-
gests that hostile environment analysis may be applied in the university con-
text Lawrence, supm note 12, at B2, col. 3. Lawrence notes the Supreme
Court recognized that black school children did not have equal educational op-
portunities if subjected to the mental assault contained in a system of segrega-
tion in Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Lawrence states that
university students face similar circumstances when forced to live and work in
an environment where they could be subject to harassing speech at any time.
Lawrence, supm note 12, at B2, col. 3. Lawrence implies that Title VII hostile
environment analysis may be used in the university context to cure academic
hostile environments, stating that the Supreme Court addressed the same type
of injury when it held that sexual harassment that creates a hostile work envi-
ronment violates the ban on sexual discrimination in employment under Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. I
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adapt the same analysis from hostile environment cases to con-
trol egregious harassment on campus.
A. TrrE VII AND TriLE IX HosTILE ENVIRONMENT
HARASSMENT
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,ss and Title IX of
the Educational Amendments of 1972,89 are federal statutes
designed to attack or prevent discrimination90 Courts interpret
both Title VII and Title IX to preclude harassment as a form of
discrimination.91 Title VII prohibits workplace discrimination
based on race, sex, religion, or national origin.?2 Title IX pro-
hibits discrimination in educational institutions on the basis of
sex.93 To determine whether an action violates Title VII or Ti-
tle IX, courts may look for a hostile environment. Courts find
hostile environments when a person is subjected to demeaning
and offensive slurs, epithets, suggestions, or similar statements
88. Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VII, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
89. Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, 86 Stat. 235, 373-75 (codified as amended at
20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1988)).
90. For a discussion of the language of Title VII and Title IX, see i ift
notes 92 and 93, respectively.
91. B. DZIECH & L. WEINER, THE LEcHERous PROFSSOR: SEXUAL HAR-
ASSMENT ON CAMPUS 19 (1984).
92. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1982 & Supp. V 1987). The legislative history of the
Equal Opportunity Act of 1972 reveals a broad congressional intent to decrease
employment discrimination based on an individual's race color, religion, na-
tional origin, or sex. See HR. REP. No. 238, 92d Cong., 2d'Sess. 103, 7*reinted
in 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Anm.IN. NEws 2137,2139.
The relevant portion of Title VII states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer... to
fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his [or her] compen-
sation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such
individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and
the courts have both interpreted the statute's language to proscribe sexual
harassment. See Guidelines on Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604 11 (1989); see also Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 72 (1986)
(holding a hostile environment claim actionable under Title VII); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 899 (11th Cir. 1979) (holding that sexual harass-
ment in the workplace can violate Title VII); Miller v. Bank of America, 600
F.2d 211, 214 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that dismissal of a black woman because
she refused sexual overtures of a supervisor violated Title VII).
93. 42 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988). Title IX provides, in relevant part: "No
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance...
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or acts that alter the conditions of the work environment 4
The legal analyses used in Title VII and Title IX hostile envi-
ronment harassment cases provide guidance for constructing
constitutional campus harassment policies.95
1. Title VII
The courts first applied hostile environment analysis to
harassment allegations in race, religion, and national origin
cases.96 For example, in Rogers v. EEOC,97 an Hispanic em-
ployee brought a Title VII suit against her former employer, an
optical company that had segregated patients by national ori-
94. Met/tor, 477 U.S. at 57.
95. The analysis uses cases from both the private and public sector. In
Jordan v. Clark, 847 F2d 1368 (9th Cir. 1988), the Ninth Circuit held that Title
VII protects government employees from sexual harassment to the same ex-
tent private employees are protected. Id. at 1372. Thus, for purposes of analy-
sis, it does not make a difference whether the cases are from private or public
entities.
A private university may fall under Title IX if it receives some sort of fed-
eral funding. In Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 557 (1984), the
Supreme Court found that Title IX applied to a college if the school received
any type of federal funding, including Basic Education Opportunity Grants
(BEOG). The decision's scope was limited, however, because the Court also
held that Title IX's coverage in this case was not institution-wide: Because the
purpose and effect of a BEOG is to provide financial assistance to the college's
financial aid program, only that financial aid program is subject to Title IX
regulation. Id. Congress passed a law to negate that decision, however, so that
the entire institution comes under Title IX's auspices if any part receives fed-
eral aid. 20 U.S.C. § 1687 (1988).
96. See generaly Cariddi v. Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, Ine., 568
F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that ethnic slurs can be so demeaning as to
create hostile environment national origin discrimination in violation of Title
VII); Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506,
514-15 (8th Cir. 1977) (holding that fire station supper clubs create a hostile
environment racial discrimination in violation of Title VII when they exclude
minorities); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, E., 545 F.2d 169, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(holding that subjecting an employee to a pattern of racial slurs violates the
employee's right to a non-discriminatory work environment); Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding national origin employment discrimi-
nation), cert denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972); Weiss v. United States, 595 F. Supp.
1050, 1056 (E.D. Va. 1984) (finding hostile environment religious discrimina-
tion); United States v. City of Buffalo, 457 F. Supp. 612, 631 (W.D.N.Y. 1978)
(finding racial employment discrimination); Compston v. Borden, Inc., 424 F.
Supp. 157,160-61 (S.D. Ohio 1976) (holding that demeaning religious slurs cre-
ated hostile environment religious discrimination violating Title VII). But cf.
Vaughn v. Pool Offshore Co., 683 F.2d 922, 923-25 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that
derogatory racial remarks did not create an unlawful work environment be-
cause all employees were subject to similar treatment).
97. 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971), cent denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972).
222 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 75:201
gin.98 The Fifth Circuit concluded that Title.VH protected the
employee's psychological, as well as economic, fringe benefits 99
Similarly, a federal district court held that Title VII may be ap-
plied to protect an employee who is subject to rdligious intimi-
dation in the workplace in Weiss v. United States.1°°
The Supreme Court more clearly outlined the factors that
must be proven to establish a hostile environment in a work-
place sexual harassment case in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vin-
son.'0' The Meritor Court specified that Title VII applies to a
98. Id at 236. The lower court held that the plaintiff had not alleged facts
sufficient to state an unlawful employment practice that would enable the
EEOC to investigate the employer and gain access to its employment applica-
tions. Id- at 237.
99. I& at 238. The Fifth Circuit found that the segregation of patients by
national origin could violate Title VII because of the negative psychological ef-
fects of the segregation on employees. I& at 237-41. The Fifth Circuit, in this
early case, sharply limited the reach of a hostile environment claim.
I do not wish to be interpreted as holding that an employer's mere ut-
terance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feel-
ings in an employee falls within the proscription of section 703 MTitle
VII]. But by the same token I am simply not willing to hold that a
discriminatory atmosphere could under no set of circumstances ever
constitute an unlawful employment practice. One can readily envi-
sion working environments so heavily polluted with discrimination as
to destroy completely the emotional and psychological stability of mi-
nority group workers, and I think... Title VII was aimed at the erad-
ication of such noxious practices.
I& *at 238.
In another early Title VII hostile environment claim, also based on race,
the Eighth Circuit concluded that employers have a duty to provide a nondis-
criminatory work environment. Firefighters Inst. for Racial Equality v. City
of St. Louis, 549 F.2d 506, 514-15 (8th Cir.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 819 (1977). In
Firefighters, the court found that the supper clubs established by firemen to
prepare dinners at the firehouses intentionally excluded minority members.
Id. at 514. The segregated eating facilities created a discriminatory hostile en-
vironment. I& The Eighth Circuit remanded ordering the district court to di-
rect the fire department to promulgate regulations either requiring the supper
clubs to include minorities or prohibit the supper clubs from using city facili-
ties. I& at 515.
100. 595 F. Supp. 1050, 1054-56 (E.D. Va. 1984) (stating that "when an em-
ployee is repeatedly subject to demeaning and offensive religious slurs... by
his supervisor, such activity necessarily has the effect of altering the condi-
tions of his employment within the meaning of Title VII").
101. 477 U.S. 57 (1986). The hostile environment sexual harassment analy-
sis was first applied in Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943-46 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Other cases employing hostile environment analysis to decide sexual harass-
ment cases include Katz v. Dole, 709 F.2d 251, 254 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that
the plaintiff, a former air traffic controller who had been the object of sexual
slurs, insults, and innuendo, was the victim of sexual harassment); Henson v.
City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 901-02 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that sexual har-
assment in the workplace may create a hostile environment in violation of Ti-
tle VII).
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hostile or offensive work environment, and it is not limited to
"economic!' or "tangible" discrimination.'02 Title VII grants
employees the right to work in an environment free from dis-
crimination, intimidation, derision, and insult.103 Sexual mis-
conduct creates prohibited sexual harassment when such
conduct unreasonably hinders an individual's work perform-
ance or creates an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working
environment. om
The Supreme Court found that not all "harassment" af-
fects a term, condition, or privilege of employment within the
meaning of Title VII.10 Harassment is not actionable under
hostile environment analysis unless its severity or pervasive-
ness alters the conditions of the victim's employment and cre-
ates an abusive worldng environment.106 The atmosphere must
102. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-67 (1986). Justice Rehn-
quist cites cases involving race, religion, and national origin to illustrate that
courts apply hostile environment analysis in Title VII harassment cases. I&
For cases involving race, religion, and national origin discrimination, see supra
note 96.
103. Meitbr, 477 U.S. at 65. The Court stated that in determining that hos-
tile environment harassment violates Title VII, the EEOC drew upon judicial
and EEOC precedent holding that employees have "the right to work in an en-
vironment free from discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult." Id.
104. Id. (citing EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination, 29 C.F.R.
§ 1604.11(a)(3) (1985)). The EEOC Guidelines on Sex Discrimination state:
Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 of Title VIL
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other
verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harass-
ment when... such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasona-
bly interfering with an individual's work performance or creating an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.i(a)(3).
105. Men oT, 477 U.S. at 67-68.
106. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 892, 904 (11th Cir.
1982)). The Court found that sexual harassment must be so severe or perva-
sive as to alter the conditions of the victim's employment, creating an abusive
working environment to be actionable. Id. The mere utterance of an ethnic or
racial epithet that engenders offensive feelings in an employee would not suf-
ficiently affect the conditions of employment as to violate Title VII. I& (quot-
ing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F2d 234,238 (5th Cir. 1971)).
Title VII was not designed to protect the unduly sensitive from a foresee-
able level of workplace harassment. ML PLAYER, EmLOYMENT DIsCmNA-
TION LAW 252 n.74 (1988). Therefore, an isolated joke, crude statement, or
sexual inquiry, even though insulting and offensive, will not create a hostile
working environment. Insults, jokes, comments, and the like must be re-
peated with sufficient regularity to become part of the regular working envi-
ronment before they will be found to create a hostile working environment.
Id. (citing Jones v. Flagship Int'l, 793 F.2d 714, 720 (5th Cir. 1986); Cariddi v.
Kansas City Chiefs Football Club, 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977)); see also Gil-
bert v. City of Little Rock, 722 F.2d 1390, 1394 (8th Cir. 1983) (stating that
190]
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be so degrading or tainted with harassment that the psychologi-
cal well-being of a reasonable employee would be affected
adversely.1o7
2. Title IX
Title IX was intended to prohibit institutions of higher
learning from discriminating on the basis of genderlca Only a
more than a few isolated incidents of harassment must have occurred to estab-
lish a Title VII violation). Further, a plaintiff who participates fully in the
harassing actions or expressions, or who encourages or condones a harasser's
conduct cannot claim that the working environment is inhospitable. AL
PLAYER, supra, at 253.
Some commentators and decisions, however, have found that harassment
does not have to be repeated in order to be actionable. See Marinelli, Title V:
Legal Protection Against Sexual Harassment, 20 AKRON L. REV. 375, 384 (1987)
(arguing that the extreme and outrageous nature of the conduct is relevant
and should not have to be repeated before the behavior can constitute actiona-
ble harassment); see also Note, Emploer Liability for Coworker Sexual Har-
assment Under Title VU, 13 N.Y.U. RHa. L. & Soc. CHANGE 83,93-95 (1984-85).
The Note states that the EEOC has found that a single incident of environ-
mental harassment can violate Title VII, and cites a number of EEOC deci-
sions to support this assertion. Ia at 94-95. For example, a violation occurs
when a supervisor refers to an employee as a "nigger," and the employee feels
insulted or intimidated. I&e at 94 & n.66. The Note also cites examples of Title
VII violations even where the injured employee was characterized as "hyper-
sensitive," where the harassment was intended as a joke, or the harassment
was directed at individuals other than the party who took offense. ML at 94 &
nn.67-69. The author concludes that courts should adopt the EEOC test for
finding a hostile workplace environment. Id at 95.
107. L PLAYER, supra; note 106, at 253. Player bases this assertion on the
following statement from Meritor: '"he correct inquiry is whether [the vic-
tim] by her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwel-
come, not whether her actual participation in sexual intercourse was
voluntary." Id. at 252-53 (citing Mentor, 477 U.S. at 68); see also Schneider,
Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEx. L. REv. 525, 556 n.187 (stat-
ing that the standard is apparently objective, although there are inconsisten-
cies in the legal analysis applied by the Mentor Court); but see Lipsett v.
University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881, 898 (ist Cir. 1988) (finding that Mer-
itor's holding leaves open the question of whether the victim or harasser per-
spective should be used in determining unwelcomeness of the harassment).
108. Title IX of the Educational Amendments of 1972 provides that "[n]o
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from partici-
pation in, be denied the benefit of, or be subjected to discrimination under any
education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20
U.S.C. § 1681(a) (1988) (exceptions omitted).
-Title IX requires that academic institutions receiving federal funding es-
tablish a sexual harassment policy and grievance procedure and appoint an
employee responsible for investigating complaints and coordinating compli-
ance efforts. 34 C.F.R § 106.8(a)-(b) (1988). If a victim feels that the institu-
tion has not complied with Title IX, the Office of Civil Rights (OCR) of the
Department of Education is required to investigate and resolve the complaint.
Id. § 100.7(c). If the OCR determines that the grievance has not been resolved,
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few plaintiffs, however, have presented claims of sexual harass-
ment under Title IX making hostile environment analysis
under Title IX unclear.109 It is uncertain whether Title IX re-
quires a showing of tangible harm to establish a valid claim of
sexual harassment, or whether the creation of a hostile envi-
ronment is sufficient.
One court ruling in a case that has aspects of both work-
place and educational institution harassment concluded that a
quasi-student/employee may bring suit based on a sexually hos-
tile environment. The First Circuit found that the Title VII
hostile environment standard for proving discrimination applies
to claims arising under Title IX in Lipsett v. University of
Puerto Rico.10 Applying the Title VII standard to this Title IX
claim, the court found that a female resident in a medical pro-
gram established a prima facie case of hostile environment har-
assment when she presented to the court overwhelming
evidence of a sexually hostile environment." The court found
it may seek termination of government funding, or it may ask the Department
of Justice to bring a suit to enforce the Title IX prohibitions. See 20 U.S.C.
§ 1682 (1988); 34 CYFI § 100.8(a)(1) (1988). Termination of funding does little
to help the victims, however, and in fact may hurt them because termination
of funding may force a university to eliminate some programs. Schneider,
supra note 107, at 532 n.35.
Instead of seeking an OCR investigation, a student may bring a suit
against the university. In Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 717
(1979), the Supreme Court found an implied private cause of action under Ti-
tle IX. The exact nature of the relief granted in such instances, however, is
unclear. Cannon did not resolve the issue of availability of monetary relief,
and the Supreme Court has not addressed the remedy issue under Title IX.
Schneider, supra note 107, at 572-74.
109. For cases presenting sexual harassment hostile environment claims
under Title IX see generally Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F2d
881, 897 (Ist Cir. 1988), discussed infrz notes 110-14 and accompanying text;
Alexander v. Yale Univ., 631 F.2d 178, 185 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that former
students' claim of sexual harassment were nonjusticiable due to the students'
graduation and the speculative nature of the alleged injuries); Moire v. Temple
Univ. School of Medicine, 613 F. Supp. 1360, 1367-70 (E.D. Pa 1985) (holding
that medical student had failed to establish her claim of harassment under Ti-
tle IX), qffrd, 800 F.2d 1136 (3d Cir. 1986).
110. 864 F2d 881, 896-97 (1st Cir. 1988); see aiso Mabry v. State Bd. of Com-
munity Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316 n.6 (10th Cir. 1987)
(noting that because Title VII prohibits the identical conduct prohibited by Ti.
tle X, the standards employed in a Title VII claim may be used in a Title IX
case), cert denied, 484 U.S. 849 (1987); O'Connor v. Peru State College, 781
F.2d 632, 642 n.8 (8th Cir. 1986) (dealing with sex discrimination in employ-
ment and implying that the standards governing claims under Title VII and
Title IX are the same).
1I1. Lipset, 864 F2d at 897-907. Sexual hostile environment harassment
occurs when one or more supervisors or co-workers create an atmosphere so
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that the resident, whose position made her both an employee
and a student of the university, had been subjected to an atmos-
phere that was so blatantly hostile the defendants" 2 had con-
structive notice that sex discrimination permeated the
residency program." 3 Under these circumstances, the court
concluded that the directors' inaction condoned, acquiesced in,
or even encouraged the illegal behavior.3 4
Hostile environment analysis under Title VII and Title IX
demonstrates that speakers are free to utter words and phrases
of their choice, no matter how abhorrent to listeners, until
those utterances go beyond mere verbalization and create a hos-
tile environment. Universities should borrow this hostile envi-
ronment concept to draft constitutional campus conduct codes.
B. TI=E VII AND TITLE IX HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT ANALYSIS
is ANALOGous TO CAMPUS HARASSMENT
Critics may argue that the workplace is not analogous to
the academic environment. They may argue that the work-
place is more routinized, and that it is more difficult to avoid
harassment in the workplace because of its limited physical
infused with hostility toward members of one sex that they alter the condi-
tions of employment for members of that sex. Id. at 897. The plaintiff alleged
that the university discharged her subsequent to harassment she received
while attending a program at the university hospital. Id. at 894. The plaintiff
also alleged that the complaints used as a basis for her discharge were infused
with discriminatory bias. I& at 907-08. The court of appeals held that the
plaintiff's specific allegations of sexual harassment made out a prima facie
case of hostile environment harassment. Id. at 905. To establish a prima fade
case of hostile environment harassment under Title IX, the plaintiff must al-
lege unwelcome sexual advances so severe or pervasive that the advances alter
the working or educational environment. Id at 898.
The court pointed to the following evidence in support of the plaintiff's
hostile sexual environment claim: a barrage of medical residents' comments
that women in general, and the plaintiff in particular, should not be surgeons;
residents' pointed threats that the plaintiff would be driven out of the resi-
dency program; the residents' repeated and unwelcome sexual advances to-
ward the plaintiff; the hostile behavior directed against the plaintiff by the
residents once it became clear that she would not accede to their sexual de-
mands; degrading pin-ups (including Playboy centerfolds, a sexually explicit
drawing of plaintiff's body, and a list containing se xually charged nicknames
of the female residents) plastered on the wall of the residents' rest facility;,
and finally, the plaintiff's nickname, "Selastraga," which translated literally
means "she swallows them." Id. at 903.
112. The defendants were university and hospital officials who, in their of-
ficial capacities, permitted the maintenance of a hostile environment. Id., 864
F.2d at 884-85.
113. rd. at 906.
114. IH at 907.
HATE SPEECH
area. On a university campus, however, there are greater op-
portunities to avoid harassment. More importantly, critics may
argue that first amendment concerns are greater in the aca-
demic community than in the workplace because the workplace
is concerned mostly with productivity, while the academic envi-
ronment is concerned with the robust debate of ideas." 5
Such criticisms are not necessarily valid. The physical lay!
out of campuses and academic facilities often provide only one
path, one lab, or one library, necessarily limiting the areas that
students traverse and frequent. Students are assigned to partic-
ular classrooms and dorm rooms, and are limited to specific li-
braries and buildings by the nature of their research,
effectively eliminating choice of locale. In this fashion, a stu-
dent's day on campus may be more routinized than a day in the
workplace. Further, unlike a workplace, students often live on
or near campus, thus making the environment even harder to
escape.
Because first amendment concerns may be greater on a
115. The first amendment has a heightened value in the academic context,
especially with respect to professors' rights to make particular statements or
teach certain theories. The Supreme Court frequently has reiterated the
United States' deep commitment to safeguarding academic freedom, "which is
of transcendent value to all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned."
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967). In Sweezy v. New
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957), the Court stated-
The essentiality of freedom in the community of American universi-
ties is almost self-evident. No one should underestimate the vital role
in a democracy that is played by those who guide and train our youth.
To impose any strait jacket upon the intellectual leaders in our col-
leges and universities would imperil the future of our Nation. No
field of education is so thoroughly comprehended by man that new
discoveries cannot yet be made. Particularly is that true in the social
sciences, where few, if any, principles are accepted as absolutes.
Scholarship cannot flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and dis-
trust. Teachers and students must always remain free to inquire, to
study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding, other-
wise our civilization will stagnate and die.
Idc at 250.
In Kim v. Coppin State College, 662 F.2d 1055 (4th Cir. 1981), the Fourth
Circuit found that our nation relies on academic institutions to encourage in-
dependent thinking, and that independent thinking
can only be developed through constant questioning, the expression of
new, untried and heterodox beliefs and the willingness to tolerate ex-
perimentation - in sum, the traditions upon which the first amend-
ment rests. It follows that our schools, particularly our universities,
must serve as great bazaars of ideas where the heavy hand of regula-
tion has little place. Like other bazaars, they may seem rude,
cacophonous, even distasteful at times; but they are necessary predi-




university campus due to the institutional interest in promoting
vigorous debate, the hostile environment concept employed in
this Note is designed to protect that interest. By limiting only
sufficiently egregious or pervasive harassment speech, the hos-
tile environment concept distinguishes the expression of ideas
- no matter how abhorrent to the listener - from harassment.
Hostile environment jurisprudence protects workplace produc-
tivity by maximizing workers' freedom of expression. It creates
a productive work atmosphere by balancin workers' freedom
of expression against the violation of other workers' work envi-
ronments. The hostile environment concept similarly would
ensure an academic environment conducive to learning. Apply-
ing hostile environment analysis in a university context would
balance all students' rights to debate and to express ideas
against all students' rights to be free from hostile learning
environments.- 6
One commentator suggests that recognition of environmen-
tal harassment claims in the academic setting is even more im-
portant than in the workplace n 7 If a university cannot
regulate harassment on campus, it may not be able to fulfill its
mission - the creation and fostering of an environment condu-
cive to intellectual growth.n 8 An abusive environment may in-
hibit harassed students from fully developing their intellectual
potential and from receiving the complete benefit of the aca-
demic program.? 9 Any pollution of that academic environment
because of racial or sexual harassment is a reduction in the ed-
ucational benefit that the student receives.? °
116. For a discussion of the effect of harassment on students, see supra
note 28, infra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
117. Schneider, supra note 107, at 551 (speaking of sexual harassment).
118. IM
119. Id The psychological harms caused by racial stigmatization often can
be more severe than those created by other stereotyping actions. Delgado,
Words Mat Wound A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epithets, and Name-
Callifg, 17 HARv. C.P-C.L. L. REV. 133, 136 (1982). Unlike many characteris-
tics on which stigmatization may be based, racial characteristics are unalter-
able, and therefore the harassment may be magnified because of a
consciousness of unalterability. Id. The psychological responses to such stig-
matization may consist of feelings of humiliation, isolation, or self-hatred and
a lack of self-worth. d. at 137. This feeling of self-hatred and lack of self-
worth may lead to further isolation by injuring relationships between mem-
bers of the victim group, and further aggravating tensions between members
of the victim group and members of the harassment group. I&. Racial stigma-
tization also may damage the victim's pecuniary interests. IE at 139.
120. See Schneider, supra note 107, at 540. Hate messages can have imme-
diate effects on victims. See, ag., Wade v. Orange County Sheriff's Office, 844
F.2d 951, 955 (2d Cir. 1988) (African-American deputy sheriff suffered emo-
[Vol. 75-201
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Even if Title VII and Title IX hostile environment harass-
ment and campus harassment are not completely analogous,=
the Supreme Court has held that universities may still issue
campus conduct codes imposing reasonable time, place, and
manner restrictions on expression when that expression inter-
feres with a substantial academic interest. Combining time,
place, and manner restrictions with hostile environment analy-
sis permits universities to determine the proper balance be-
tween a university's duty to promote the free -exchange of ideas
and the university's goal of providing all students with a non-
discriminatory learning environment. The next section of this
Note provides a model campus conduct policy that reflects hos-
tile environment analysis.
C. A MODEL CAMPUS CoNDucT POLiCY
The district court in Doe v. University of Michigan= left
open the possibility that the academic community's need for a
non-hostile campus environment could overcome the presump-
tion of absolute first amendment protection for utterances. 4
Thus, University of Michigan suggests that the University of
Michigan could have pursued reasonable time, place, and man-
ner restrictions that would survive constitutional review. 2
When it finalized its harassment policy, however, the Univer-
sity deleted a section that, as originally drafted, would have
prohibited the creation of academic hostile environments. 25
The Model Policy proposed below attempts to cure the
tional distress and humiliation from racial discrimination at work); Wilming-
ton v. JI. Case Co., 793 F.2d 909, 922 (8th Cir. 1986) (African-American welder
suffered severe health complicati6ns as a result of several years of racial har-
assment and employment discrimination). To avoid being subject to harass-
ment, victims have had to quit jobs, forgo educational opportunities, and
curtail their own freedom of speech rights. See Matsuda, supra note 28, at
2337. The harassment can destroy a victim's sense of self-worth and self-es-
teem, and can isolate the victim. Id- at 2337-38. Furthermore, harassment may
cause the victim to be hostile toward all members of the harassing group. Id
at 2339.
12L Application of hostile environment harassnent to Title IX assumes
that Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (Ist Cir. 1988), is good
law. For an analysis of Lipsett, see supra notes 110-14 and accompanying text.
122. See supr notes 43-65 and accompanying text.
123. 721 F. Supp. 852 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
124. Apparently, the University of Michigan attempted to. classify its policy
as a fighting words restriction. Id. at 854-58. The district court held the policy
unconstitutional because it was vague and overbroad. Id. at 864-67.
125. UniversitY of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 863.
126. For an explanation of the Michigan Policy, see supra note 68.
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problems with the Michigan Policy. The Model Policy, how-
ever, does not deal with a number of important issues regarding
the effectiveness of codes.' Each institution must incorporate
its policy into a structure that fits the institution's needs. This
model language considers only those first amendment issues
that are likely to arise in drafting such a policy.2
I. This University is committed to the values and ideals of the
first amendment. Nowhere is the commitment to free speech
more important than at a university, where the search and ad-
vancement of knowledge depend on the free exchange and con-
sideration of ideas. Due to the need to foster an environment of
creativity and diversity, members of the University community
must expect to encounter, and are expected to tolerate, ideas
and concepts with which they disagree or which they find ab-
horrent. In furtherance of the University's academic mission,
no member of the community has the right to prevent another
from holding an opinion or expressing a view in a way that is
appropriate to explore, promote, or defend the view. Intimida-
tion of members of the University community to prevent the
expression of these views is a violation of this Policy.
H. The University is committed to the principles and values of
equal access, equal opportunity, and non-discrimination in edu-
cation. Each student has the right to an education without dis-
crimination on the basis of race, sex, religion, disability, sexual
orientation, national origin, ancestry, or ethnic origin. Perva-
sive or severe harassment of members of the University com-
munity by other members of the community may create a
hostile educational environment that infringes on a University
member's right to an education. Such discriminatory harass-
ment is considered a violation of this Policy.
III. Protected free expression ends and prohibited discriminatory
harassment begins when vilification of, or threats of violence
against, members of the University community on the basis of
127. For example, the proposal does not address due process concerns. Se-
lection of a committee to review allegations against alleged harassers is an-
other important consideration that the proposal does not address. For
discussion of the importance of selecting an appropriate review committee, see
Schneider, supra note 107, at 574-82.
128. Any policy should explicitly prohibit physical or threatened physical
abuse of any member of the university community, or of a guest of a member
of the community, if that physical abuse or threat is based on a person's race,
religion, national origin, sex, sexual orientation, disability, ancestry, or age.
This list is not exhaustive; a university should include any additional charac-
teristics it deems appropriate.
Furthermore, physical abuse or threatened violence not based on one of
the above categories still would be a violation of a campus conduct code. This
Note does not discuss this topic.
Finally, the author notes that some of the language in the Model Policy
reflects language that some universities -have adopted, or that is currently
under consideration. The borrowed language in the Model Policy has been al-
tered to reflect a hostile environment analysis.
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race, sex, religion, disability, sexual orientation, national origin,
ancestry, or ethnic origin creates a hostile environment. Speech
or other expression constitutes hostile environment harassment
if it is:
A. Intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or a small,
identifiable group of individuals on the basis of their race,
sex, religion, disability, sexual orientation, national origin,
ancestry, or ethnic origin;
B. Is addressed directly to the individual or individuals whom
it insults or stigmatizes; and
C. Amounts to fighting words or is so pervasive or severe that
it creates a hostile academic environment. These expres-
sions, in addition to their insulting or stigmatizing content,
must be commonly understood to convey, in a direct and
visceral way, hatred or contempt for an individual or identi-
fiable small groups based on of their race, sex, religion, dis-
ability, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry, or
ethnic origin in question.
IV. Whether certain behavior constitutes harassment must be ex-
amined in light of the particular incident. A single harassing
act may be so severe or pervasive as to constitute a hostile envi-
ronment in violation of this Policy.
V. Intent to discriminate on the basis of race, sex, religion, disabil-
ity, sexual orientation, national origin, ancestry, or ethnic origin
is necessary to sanction a person under this Policy. Intent will
be determined by consideration of all of the relevant
circumstances.
A. If a member of the University community asks another
member of the community to stop a harassment action or
expression, and that person continues the action, intent
will be presumed.
B. Expression of an opinion, no matter how abhorrent to the
community, which does not contain epithets, is not directed
to a particular individual or identifiable group, and does not
demonstrate intent to harass when all the circumstances
are considered, is not a violation of this Policy.
VI. An objective legal standard will be used to help define and eval-
uate harassment claims.
VII. This Policy applies to every member of the University commu-
nity, including students, faculty, and staff. This Policy will be
in effect in every University-owned or operated facility, includ-
ing classroom and administrative buildings, research facilities,
libraries, and athletic and recreation centers. This Policy does
not apply to university sponsored publications or open spaces on
campus grounds, but the University reserves the right to make
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions in keeping with
existi legal precedent.
D. THE MODEL PoLicY: CONSTITrIONAL AS APPLED
The Model Policy xneets the Supreme Court's existing
time, place, and manner standards. Sections I and II of the
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Model Policy explicitly recognize the issues at stake in making
a time, place, and manner restriction: balancing first amend-
ment concerns against the governmental interest.2 9 In so do-
ing, these provisions inform the academic community of the
policy considerations behind application of the Model Policy.
Only harassment of academic community members that is so
severe or pervasive as to create a hostile environment, thus in-
fringing on another's right to an education, will be subject to
university restriction. 3 0
The proposed Model Policy does not suffer from the consti-
tutional maladies of the Michigan Policy.1s1 It is neither uncon-
stitutionally vague nor overbroad because it specifies what
conduct will be deemed unacceptable. Sections EI and IV of
the Model Policy outline when speech no longer will be pro-
tected. Protected free expression ends and discriminatory har-
assment' begins when threats against or vilification of a
university member based on an immutable characteristic create
a hostile environment 3 2 The perpetrator must intend to insult
the victim, must address the insults at the victim, and the in-
sults must result in the creation of a hostile environment.LI 3
129. For a discussion of the balance of interests in restricting first amend-
ment speech, see supra notes 39-44.
130. For a discussion of the factors that must be present for the creation of
a hostile environment, see supra notes 106-107 and accompanying text.
131. See supt notes 76-82 and accompanying text.
132. See Model Policy § I., supmz pp. 230-31. One commentator, Mari
Matsuda, suggests that a campus conduct policy must have a very narrow defi-
nition of harassment speech to respect first amendment values. See Matsuda,
supmr note 28, at 2357. Matsuda suggests that in order to distinguish the worst
forms of harassment speech from other forms of speech, a definition must con-
tain three identifying characteristics: 1) a message of inferiority, 2) the
message contained in the targeted speech must be directed at a historically op-
pressed group; and 3) the message of the speech must be persecutorial, hateful,
and degrading. Id. Matsuda argues that making the presence of all of these
elements a prerequisite to prosecution will prevent undue censorship. Id. at
2358.
Matsuda defends the first element as the primary identifier of racist
speech; racist speech proclaims racial inferiority and denies the personhood of
target group members. Id All members of the targeted group are at once con-
sidered homogenous and inferior. Matsuda's second element attempts to fur-
ther define racism by recognizing the connection of racism to power and
subordination Id. Racism is more than race hatred or prejudice; it is the
structural subordination of a group based on an idea of racial inferiority. Ra-
cist speech is particularly harmful because it is a mechanism of subordination,
reinforcing a historical vertical relationship. The final element is related to
the "fighting words" idea. Id. The language used in the worst forms of racist
speech is language that is, and is intended as, persecutorial, hateful, and
degrading.
133. See Model Policy § I., supra pp. 230-31.
HATE SPEECH
To help ensure that members of the university community
are aware of what constitutes acceptable expression, thus avoid-
ing the constitutional infirmity of vagueness, a university
should attach a commentary to its campus conduct policy and
disseminate both the policy and commentary to all university
community members.P4 The attachment should cite examples
of both acceptable and nonacceptable behavior and delineate
the possible sanctions for various types of unacceptable behav-
ior.- The commentary should, as clearly as possible, define
the type of expression that may result in the creation of a hos-
tile environment.lss Further, the commentary's examples
should be as precise as practical to guarantee that members of
the university are not misled, although some degree of flexibil-
ity is permissible.137 The University of Michigan issued such a
commentary, but later recalled it due to inaccuracieswlss
134. The commentary should follow closely the factors and incidents that
courts have used to decide both Title VII and Title IX hostile environment
harassment cases. For a discussion of the factors that courts employ to decide
hostile environment harassment cases, see supra note 106-07 and accompany-
ing texL
135. This Note does not address appropriate sanctions for violations of the
Model Policy. Sanctions, however, should range from official reprimand to ex-
pulsion, depending on the severity of the offense and the recidivism of the
offender.
136. The definition must state what type of behavior constitutes harass-
ment. Although no definition can state explicitly what words or acts consti-
tute harassment, a policy should at least outline the broad categories of
proscribed activities. Speech or other expression constitutes harassment if it is
intended to insult or stigmatize an individual or an identifiable group of indi-
viduals on the basis of an immutable characteristic. The definition of harass-
ment should encompass non-verbal symbols such as pictures or other symbols
that by virtue of their form are commonly understood to convey direct and vis-
ceral hatred of or contempt for individuals on the basis of an immutable char-
acteristic. A policy containing a definition of harassment along these lines,
would probably withstand a constitutional challenge on the grounds of vague-
ness and overbreadth. As held in Papish v. Board of Curators, 464 F.2d 136
(8th Cir. 1972), mv'd per curiam, 410 U.S. 667 (1973), a harassment policy can
retain some flexibility and still withstand a constitutional challenge. Id at
142-44. For an additional discussion of flexibility of regulations, see supa note
56.
137. Despite the need for precision in the commentary, the explanation
must nevertheless envision a broad range of unwelcome behavior, from verbal
innuendo to overt conduct. See Note, Sexual Harasment and Title V, 51
N.Y.U. L. REv. 148, 164 n.76 (1976) (comparing sexual harassment to racial
harassment and postulating that while a derogatory epithet generally is known
to be unwelcom% sexual advance is not).
138. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 860 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
The commentary was the University's authoritative interpretation of its har-
assment policy. One example from the commentary, directly applicable to
Doe's case, stated: "A male student makes remarks in class like 'Women just
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Despite attempts at precision, however, each particular sit-
uation must be evaluated independently to determine if the
challenged behavior constitutes harassment. Drawing a line be-
tween the permissible and impermissible is difficult in the ab-
stract.1 39 Merely telling an ethnic joke or repeating a racial
epithet may not be sufficient to support a claim of harass-
ment.14 0 Harassment must be severe or pervasive enough to
contaminate a student's learning environment.141 The atmos-
phere must be so degrading that a reasonable student in a simi-
lar situation would be affected adversely.142 Campus conduct
policies should not be designed to protect overly sensitive stu-
dents from a foreseeable level of academic harassment.14 3
Thus, most isolated jokes or statements, although insulting or
aren't as good in this field as men,' thus creating a hostile learning atmosphere
for female classmates." I&i The University argued in court that it had with-
drawn the commentary because it contained several inaccuracies. The decision
to withdraw the commentary, however, was not announced campus-wide. I&
Therefore, many students necessarily would have worried about being charged
with harassment under the Michigan Policy. Id.
The University of Wisconsin distributed a simila commentary along with
its discriminatory harassment policy. An example from the commentary is as
follows:
Question: In a class discussion concerning women in the workplace,
a male student states his belief that women are by nature better
equipped to be mothers than executives, and thus should not be em-
ployed in upper level management positions. Is this statement action-
able under proposed UWS 17.06(2)?
Answer. No. The statement is an expression of opinion, contains no
epithets, is not directed to a particular individual, and does not, stand-
ing alone, evince the requisite intent to demean or to create a hostile
environment.
The University of Wisconsin System, University of Wisconsin System Discrim-
inatory Harassment- Prohibited Conduct Under Chapter UWS 17 Revisions 4
(1989).
139. Schneider, supmr note 107, at 533 (citing EEOC Guidelines on Sex Dis-
crimination, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(b) (1985)).
140. Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (quoting Rogers v. EEOC,
454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971)). The court in Bgers concluded that the
"mere utterance of an ethnic or racial epithet which engenders offensive feel-
ings in an employee" does not affect the terms, conditions, or privileges of em-
ployment to a sufficiently significant degree to violate Title VII. Id. For
further discussion of this issue, see supc note 106.
141. See supr'a note 106.
142. See Henson, 682 F.2d at 904 (stating that to violate Title VII, the har-
assment must be sufficiently severe to create an abusive work environment);
f Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. at 57, 67-68 (1986) (finding that sex-
ual harassment must be so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of the
victim's employment, creating an abusive working environment to be actiona-
ble); see also supnz notes 106-07 and accompanying text.




offensive, would not rise to the level of impermissibly interfer-
ing with the academic environment.' 4
Although isolated statements are probably not actionable, a
harassment policy that reprimands an individual only after that
individual repeatedly commits harassing acts is difficult to en-
force. To deal with this situation, the First Circuit in Lipsett,1
found a hostile sexual environment because of the conduct of a
specific group of residents, rather than a single person.'4 Simi-
larly, on a campus as a whole, a hostile environment can arise
from single acts of discrimination and harassment on the part
of many unrelated individuals. 47 Section IV of the Model Pol-
icy acknowledges that a single act may violate the policy. The
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission found that a sin-
gle incident of environmental harassment can violate Title
VII.'m The egregious nature of the conduct is relevant;149 the
conduct may be so offensive that the individual act itself is suf-
ficient to constitute hostile environment harassment.1se An
outrageous expression should not have to be repeated to consti-
tute actionable harassment.
Section V of the Model Policy protects against undue re-
striction of expression when the alleged harasser did not intend
to harass. Section V anticipates disciplinary action only against
a student who intends to create a hostile environment. Stu-
dents who insensitively use derogatory remarks without intent
to harm someone or some group should be educated, but not
punished. The threat of prosecution for thoughtless or insensi-
tive misuse of expression creates the risk of chilling cabnpus
144. For a discussion of the standards used to determine hostile environ-
ment harassment, see id.
145. 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988).
146. Id. at 903; see suprt notes 111-12 and accompanying text.
147. See T. Grey, supra note 15, at 5-6.
148. See Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F-2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981); see a~so sup,
note 16 and accompanying text
149. Bundy, 641 F.2d at 944.
150. Note, supra note 137, at 164 n.76 (stating that to allow a single inci-
dent of sexual harassment to constitute a violation of Title VII would create a
problem, because while derogatory epithets are generally known to be unwel-
come, a supervisor may not realize that his or her attentions will be unwel-
come prior to the first advance). When sexual attentions take an extreme or
coercive form, however, even one incident may be too many. I& A single
physical or verbal offense made in a harassing manner may have serious psy-
chological effects. I& The author concludes that in such cases Title VII
should offer immediate relief. I& This change in the law would not create a
flurry of litigation because few victims would bring suits based on one isolated
incident. Id.
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political or academic debate regarding sensitive issues.'5 1 Con-
fining disciplinary proceedings to intended harassment should
prevent any serious chilling effect.
Statements directed to the campus in general or the public
at large, even if disparaging to a certain group, should not come
under a conduct code. Refusing to extend a conduct code to
such expression gives extra room to promote vigorous public
debate on campus, protecting even extreme and offensive ex-
pressions in the public context against the potentially chilling
effect of disciplinary procedures. For harassment to be actiona-
ble under section V, it must be directed at a particular person
or an identifiable group of people.
Section VI of. the Model Policy states that an objective
legal standard should be employed to define harassment and to
evaluate claims. Evaluating behavior by an objective standard
instead of the subjective perception of the victim provides a
greater degree of certainty in establishing the contours of pro-
hibited conduct.1 52 An objective standard has two benefits: it
will protect victims from the defense that the accused viewed
151. See T. Grey, supm note 15, at 7.
152. See Note, Seaual Harasment Claims of Abusive Work Environment
Under Title VII, 97 HARv. L. REV. 1449, 1459 (1984) (arguing that in order to
evaluate the offensiveness of the challenged conduct, the proper perspective is
that of a reasonable victim, because this would protect both the accused and
the victim from divergent perceptions of appropriate behavior); see also
Schneider, supra note 107, at 536-37. Schneider points out that the objective
standard is used in the tort analyses of negligence and assault and battery.
Schneider argues that assault and battery provide a good analogy because, like
harassment, assault and battery involve an affront to one's dignity. IH! In de-
termining the existence of an assault, courts have used the reasonable person
test to determine whether the apprehension of the victim normally would be
experienced in that particular situation. The court focuses on the reasonable
victim rather than on the intent of the perpetrator. IL
Schneider also argues, however, that the reasonable student standard
should be subject to an exception when the defendant intends to evoke a par-
ticular reaction, even if the victim's reaction is unreasonable. I at 538.
Therefore, if a harasser has knowledge of a victim's unusual sensitivity and
provokes the victim based on this knowledge, the harasser would be guilty of
violating the policy regardless of the reasonable student standard.
Schneider notes that the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
the appropriate standard directly. In Meritor, the Supreme Court used ambig-
uous language. In one section of the opinion, the Court established the stan-
dard from the perpetrator's perception of the victim's conduct. I& at 536-37(" 'the correct inquiry is whether [the plaintiff] by her conduct indicate[s] that
the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not .whether her actual partici-
pation in sexual intercourse was voluntary"' (quoting Meritor Say. Bank v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,66-67 (1986))). In another sentence, however, the Supreme
Court evaluated the behavior from the subjective perspective of the victim. I&
at 538 (" '[a] complainant's sexually provocative speech or dress is [not neces-
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the behavior as appropriate, but it will not penalize defendants
whose victims are unusually sensitive.'-e If a defendant persists
in abusive conduct after the victim has notified the defendant
that the victim finds the conduct offensive, the Model Policy
will be violated, thereby protecting the sensitive victim.!
In addition, under Section VII.of the Model Policy, harass-
ment expressions are sanctionable only in university facilities
that members of the university community must use to facili-
tate their work Public places, such as the quadrangle or play-
ing fields that can be avoided, are not subject to the automatic
restrictions of the Model Policy, and restrictions in such areas
would have to be particularized to each situation.- Under the
Model Policy, John Doe, the University of Michigan plaintiff,
would have been able to express his academic theories in class
without fear of censorship. Academic theories in the classroom,
no matter how abhorrent to other students, are not sanction-
able unless they are intended to insult another student and are
severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile environment.
CONCLUSION
A university may proscribe harassment speech through a
campus policy that restricts the manner in which expression is
made but does not attempt to regulate the advocacy of a partic-
ular idea. Universities have the obligation to promulgate cam-
pus conduct policies that protect the educational environment.
To withstand constitutional challenge, the policies must not
prohibit the communication of a constitutionally protected idea.
This Note suggests affording university students the same pro-
sarily] irrelevant as a matter of law in determining whether he or she found
particular sexual advances unwelcome'" (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68)).
In Lipsett v. University of Puerto Rico, 864 F.2d 881 (1st Cir. 1988), the
court found that in a sexual harassment case, both parties must make an effort
to determine which perspective will apply. Id. at 898. The defendant must be
sensitive to signals from the victim that the defendant's comments and actions
are unwelcome and the victim must take responsibility for telling the defend-
ant that such comments and actions are unwelcome. Id. The court found that
in other instances, the victim's consistent failure to respond to suggestive com-
ments or gestures may be sufficient to communicate that the defendant's ac-
tions are unwelcome. I
153. Id.; Schneider, supra note 107, at 536.
154. See Note, supra note 152, at 1459.
155. In Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973), the Supreme
Court held that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions are permissi-
ble if they further the university's academic mission or enhance the academic
environment. Id at 670. For a further discussion of this issue, see supra notes
43, 54, 59, and accompanying text.
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tection from all forms of discriminatory harassment that em-
ployees receive. Title VII and Title IX provide a framework
universities use to satisfy first amendment concerns.
By carefully balancing the first amendment's principle of
freedom of expression, especially in the academic context,
against the importance of providing a non-discriminatory aca-
demic environment, universities may draft constitutional regu-
lations that will restrict harassment expressions without
resorting to censorship. This Note suggests a Model Policy.
Such policies are needed to promote understanding and educate
people about hatred, facilitate the exchange of ideas, and to
provide equal access to education.
John T Shapiro
